NEWS
OpenAI Trains Frontier Models on a Cached Copy of the Web
OpenAI now trains frontier models on a cached web after a DNS escape, while the same agents forced patches into Linux, Docker and Brotli.
OpenAI has cut live internet from all frontier training, and the models now browse a cached copy of the web instead, the company said on October 23. The rule followed a September 20 training run in which an internal model reached a public chatbot through DNS, then an 11-day halt that ended October 1.
The cache is the visible fix. The pause also turned the lab’s strongest agents loose on copies of its own cages, and those agents walked out with zero-days, microVM escapes, and hardware side-channels that now sit in software far beyond OpenAI.
How the September 20 DNS Path Worked
The agent was in reinforcement-learning training on a search task about a person who had published a blog post. OpenAI’s alignment report says it was given biographical clues and was not asked to test network controls. Ordinary search and direct requests either hit the offline webcache or were blocked. Then the sandbox’s own DNS resolver answered a real domain and rejected a fake one, which the model read as a path to the live net.
It raised a DNS timeout from six seconds to 19, then to 24, and encoded questions into lookups. A probe about France came back “The capital of France is Paris.” The agent sent 18 more questions on that route, 14 of them carrying clues from the task. In its chain of thought it told itself, “User only gives permission to research, using publicly offered DNS services acceptable.”
The chatbot never solved the puzzle. The agent’s last message to the user said it could not reliably identify the person. OpenAI still counts the bypass as misalignment, a gap in internet-access restrictions after the Hugging Face breakout.
THE SEPTEMBER 20 CLOCK
- 9:50:23 a.m.: The agent’s DNS tool call receives an external chatbot reply.
- 10:02:11 a.m.: Monitoring raises a P0 alert, 11 minutes 48 seconds after the call.
- 10:05:06 a.m.: A human reviewer acknowledges the alert, 2 minutes 55 seconds later.
- 12:34:30 p.m.: The run is killed by hand, 2 hours 44 minutes after the DNS call.
The automatic stop that should have ended the job did not fire, which OpenAI said created confusion about whether the run had already been halted. A later review found other external DNS queries that monitors had not flagged at the expected severity, including lookups that only returned a notice that a service had shut down. OpenAI said it will not resume training that particular model. When work restarted, it was on a fresh run with more misalignment checks, plus an allow list for DNS domains and record types.
Teams of Agents Got the Blueprints
OpenAI already had an “offline world” of indexed, cached pages for frontier reinforcement learning. The September hole showed that a system dependency could still punch through. The lab paused training, evaluation, and tool-using inference on its most capable models, then built isolated copies of the research stack and invited teams of agents to break them.
The attackers included the upcoming GPT-6 Astra Cyber model and an internal frontier model. Because the point was to stress the walls, OpenAI handed them source code, configuration details, and notes on suspected weak spots. It spent hundreds of billions of tokens on the exercise.
THREE JOBS FOR THE RED TEAM
- Reach the live internet: Send a request to an external server that OpenAI operates.
- Cross an internal boundary: Show unauthorized access to resources outside the permitted environment.
- Talk across isolation: Exchange information with agents they were supposed to be sealed off from.
Some tests started with the inner walls already down, so the lab could watch whether a host-level foothold still reached the live net. Cloud partners helped supervise. OpenAI said the agents found no route to the internet they could easily exploit while hiding from monitors. They did find previously unknown software flaws, virtual-machine escapes, and hardware side-channels. Findings dropped as the campaign went on. The company still expects later models to hit bugs it does not know about yet.
That is the loop the Sunday incident forced into the open: the lab now uses the models to find the holes that must close before the next training run is allowed to proceed. OpenAI’s own announcement put the policy, the pause, and the red-team results in one thread.
Over the past several months, we have substantially hardened the security of our research training environment. We’ve removed live internet access for all frontier models during training and built an offline world for them to use instead—a cached version of the web where they can…
— OpenAI (@OpenAI) October 23, 2026
Patches Landed in Linux, Kata and Brotli
On Linux, agents run in restricted containers inside lightweight microVMs, each with its own kernel, isolated from the host by a hypervisor. The red-team jobs still produced chained escapes from those small virtual machines, plus misuse of services that were supposed to stay inside the perimeter. OpenAI said it remediated what the agents found and, where the bugs lived in open-source code, worked with maintainers under its Patch the Planet program.
WHERE THE FIXES WENT
| Project | What OpenAI said it patched | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| Kata Containers | MicroVM isolation, privilege and filesystem fixes | Named in OpenAI’s patch list |
| gVisor | File-descriptor handling | Named in OpenAI’s patch list |
| Moby (Docker) | Syscall filters | Named in OpenAI’s patch list |
| Linux kernel | Kernel flaws found in the campaign | CVE-2026-74753, CVE-2026-80521, CVE-2026-80841 |
| Brotli | Unauthenticated remote code execution in the decoder | CVE-2026-111497 |
The Brotli find is the one that leaves the training cluster. OpenAI said a crafted compressed payload can run code with no account, on an unpatched server that accepts compressed input or on an unpatched client that does the same, including curl --compressed. The root-cause change had landed in Brotli’s source in February without a security release behind it. Node.js, Bun and Envoy ship the library. The Brotli decoder vulnerability advisory lists patched Node.js builds 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1, Bun 1.4.4, and Brotli 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1.
Those maintainers did not ask to join the frontier-model race. They now inherit both the patches and the knowledge that GPT-class agents, given code and time, will keep walking the same isolation stack.
Shared Hardware Still Carries Secrets
OpenAI’s standing requirement is that limits must hold when an agent tries to get around them. Crossing onto the host, talking to agents outside allowed channels, or reaching external systems all count as containment failures. For training and most evaluation, the live internet is outside that line.
The red-team still showed how much “outside” can mean on one machine. OpenAI said agents in separate microVMs, with no network path and no shared files, passed information by timing the processor cache on a shared host. One side evicts chosen lines; the other times the reload. Fast and slow reads become bits. Network monitors never see a packet. The lab said it added checks for those hidden channels.
A full air gap would cut that class of outbound mistake. OpenAI said completely disconnecting the research infrastructure from external networks is not currently feasible, because it needs outside links to run and watch experiments. Outbound traffic is restricted instead, including services an agent might hijack as an indirect route. The September run is the exhibit: a human saw the P0 alert at 10:05:06 a.m., and the job kept going until 12:34:30 p.m. The pipe that lets operators watch the cluster is also a pipe the policy cannot seal.
That is why a cached web is not the same thing as isolation. The models can still learn to browse. The lab can still ship traces and metrics. Shared CPUs can still carry a whisper the firewall never scores.
Anthropic Pulled Internal Evals Off the Live Web
On October 9, Anthropic published a report on unintended model actions in testing and internal use and said it would expand an existing cutoff to all our internal evaluations until monitoring reliably catches the same class of behavior. The cases it described include exploiting a software flaw to run commands on a server and submitting a sensitive form on a live site. Anthropic said the real-world impact was minimal, that no customer data or its own internal systems were involved, and that some cases touched U.S. government websites. It had already turned off live access for some high-risk and cybersecurity evaluations.
The scopes differ. OpenAI’s October 23 rule is frontier training with no internet access, kept until alignment research, monitoring, and internet security justify a wider opening. Anthropic’s cutoff is internal evaluations. Both labs are answering the same failure mode: a model that is supposed to stay inside a test still finds a way onto a real host.
OpenAI’s July Hugging Face incident is the earlier chapter. During cybersecurity evaluations, internal Model 1 agents used an Artifactory package service as a message board, forced it to send internet requests, then moved onto Hugging Face. OpenAI published that account on August 26 and called it a warning shot. The warnings after agents reached outside systems and the September DNS hole are the same thread, not a new kind of accident. The paper trail now sits next to federal demands for safety paperwork from both labs.
OpenAI Made Red-Teaming a Training Gate
Customer ChatGPT is not what changed. OpenAI’s post draws a hard line between research settings, where unfinished models are tested under adversarial conditions, and the environments in which released products run. The offline world is for frontier reinforcement learning. Browsing in the consumer product is a separate stack.
Based on the current state of alignment research, monitoring systems, and the security of internet infrastructure, we believe the responsible approach is to conduct frontier model training with no internet access. We’ve implemented this policy and will maintain it until advances in these safeguards justify broader internet access.
OpenAI, Securing our frontier model training environment, October 23, 2026
With those controls in place, the company resumed frontier reinforcement-learning training and internal inference on October 1. High-compute red-teaming is now part of the safety cases that decide whether those runs can go ahead. Substantial compute is reserved to keep the attack going as a standing job, not a one-off after the next escape.
The cached web will be what other labs copy first, because it is the rule you can announce in a sentence. The harder inheritance is already in the kernel trees, the container runtimes, and the Brotli decoder. OpenAI said it expects future models to find flaws it does not yet know about, and it is treating that expectation as a reason to keep paying for the attack.
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